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achievement, we present new research findings that can help to inform those discussions.
In this CPRE Policy Brief, we examine the extent to which the assumptions in the law manifest themselves
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leaders—administrators and teachers— respond to the results of state assessment systems and the
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Much has been written in the last decade
about the spotlight that the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) shines on school
performance. Proponents and opponents
alike are quick to discuss the law’s rigid
definitions of school performance—
exemplified by the classification of schools as
making Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) or
not making AYP based largely on annual
tests in reading and mathematics,
disaggregating school performance by
student subgroups, and requiring that all
schools reach 100% proficiency. Yet for all its
rigidity, the law has offered schools little
guidance on how to make use of the
performance data that the new systems
provide or how to design improvement
efforts. As policymakers discuss ways to
change NCLB or design new federal
education policies targeted at improving
academic achievement, we present new
research findings that can help to inform
those discussions.

NCLB is based on the assumption that by
using new data provided by testing, drawing
public attention to student performance, and
establishing sanctions for poor results,
teachers and school leaders will be motivated
and able to identify and adopt successful
strategies for their students (Stecher, Epstein,
Hamilton, Marsh, Robyn, McCombs et al.,
2008; Hamilton, Berends, & Stecher, 2005;
Haertel & Herman, 2005; Linn, 2005). In
order for this assumption to be accurate,
being identified as “in need of
improvement” (the designation for schools
that fail to meet AYP goals) would have to
set off a chain reaction, wherein school or
district personnel examine performance data,
draw conclusions about where their
challenges lie, search for programs and
materials to address their challenges, and
finally implement those new programs,
balancing fidelity to the programs’ designs
with sensitivity to local context.
Prior to the mandatory testing and reporting
required by NCLB, school improvement
efforts were shown to lack coherence
(Newman, Smith, Allensworth, & Bryk,
2001) and often included conflicting
programs (Hatch, 2002). Part of the theory
of performance-based accountability in
general, and NCLB in particular, was based
on the belief that regular and comprehensive
evidence would help to focus these efforts.
Research seems to indicate, however, that
individuals vary widely in their assumptions
about the value and purpose of evidence
(Coburn & Talbert, 2006), that it is often
difficult to identify students’ challenges based
on the resulting annual data (Black &
Wiliam, 1998), and that searches for
meaningful remedies to real or imagined
problems are often extremely limited,
somewhat chaotic, and frequently lead back
to familiar practices as opposed to real
change or innovation (Gross, Kirst, Holland,
& Luschei, 2005).

In this CPRE Policy Brief, we examine the extent
to which the assumptions in the law manifest
themselves in the actions that school leaders take.
This brief asks and answers the question: How do
school leaders—administrators and teachers—
respond to the results of state assessment systems and
the pressure of performance-based accountability?
And do those responses seem to matter to
achievement outcomes?

Policy Brief

Our findings are drawn from a three-year CPRE
study of schools throughout the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Our data come from four main
sources. First, we conducted phone interviews with
48 Pennsylvania principals in the fall of 2008 to
determine the various strategies they employ to
meet the performance targets required under
NCLB. Second, using data from the telephone
interviews, we developed and administered a survey
to all elementary and secondary school principals in
Pennsylvania in 2009, asking detailed questions
about the types of strategies schools employ and the
degree of effort they exert to support those
strategies. Third, we conducted in-depth site visits at
11 schools—9 of which had been placed in
“warning” status as a result of not making AYP
following the 2007-2008 school year and two of
which had made AYP. Each school was visited
twice—once in the spring of 2009 and again in the
spring of 2010—to get a sense of each school’s
improvement efforts and strategies over time.
Finally, we looked at school-level achievement data
to examine the link between selected improvement
strategies and school performance. (See Appendix
for more detail about the data collection).

Using previous research on school improvement
(e.g., Gross & Goertz, 2005; Marzano, 2003;
Newman et al., 2001; Learning First Alliance, 2003)
and the initial principal interviews as guides, we
identified nine categories of school improvement
efforts on our principal survey. On the survey,
principals were asked about each category as well as
about 46 specific strategies related to the nine
categories. (See Box 1 for a list of the nine
categories.) For example, principals were asked how
much effort they devoted to “introducing new
instructional approaches” and also were asked
specific questions about the use of strategies such as
“common instructional practices in every classroom
(e.g., differentiated instruction, responsive
classrooms, student engagement strategies, formative
assessment, etc.)” or the adoption of “literacy
strategies used across the school (e.g., Reading
Apprenticeship, guided reading, etc.).” While some
of the categories are quite broad, the specific
strategies listed on the survey all fall into one of
these nine categories and are more narrowly
defined. In addition, principals were asked
whether they devoted “minor,” “moderate,” or
“major” effort to each of the general categories
and specific strategies during the current and
previous school years.
Box 1

Nine Categories of Strategies for Improvement
1. New instructional approaches
2. New student and staff schedules
3. New or aligned curriculum

The research reported here was supported by the Institute of
Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, through Grant
R305A080280 to the University of Pennsylvania. The opinions
expressed are those of the authors and do not represent views of the
Institute or the U.S. Department of Education.
This brief has been internally and externally reviewed to meet
CPRE’s quality assurance standards. All data presented, statements
made, and views expressed are the responsibility of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education, or its institutional partners.
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4. State test (PSSA) preparation
5. Remediation for struggling students
6. Data analysis to guide improvement
7. Outside expertise
8. Rewards and sanctions for performance
9. Efforts to address non-academic issues

Our objective is to examine three specific claims
about NCLB to see if they hold true 10 years after
the law’s enactment. We first ask if schools that have
been identified as “in need of improvement”
implement more efforts or different kinds of efforts
than those schools that meet performance targets.
Some previous research suggests that while all schools
are responsive to accountability pressure (Goertz &
Gross, 2005), high-performing schools and lowperforming schools select fundamentally different
strategies (Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio,
2007; Mintrop, 2004; Hopkins, Harris, & Jackson,
1997). This research suggests that schools with large
percentages of low-scoring students are more likely to
focus on “teaching to the test,” while schools that
generally perform well but see problems with certain
groups of students are more likely to consider and
adopt more fundamental educational change (Haertel
& Herman, 2005; Anagnostopoulos, Rutledge, Lynn,
& Dreeben, 1999; Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, &
Stecher, 1996; Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985).
To some extent, our research contradicts these claims
from earlier research. We found that schools that
make AYP and those that don’t make AYP generally
place major effort on the same types of reform
strategies. Similar to some more recent research
(Mintrop & Trujillo, 2007), we find that low- and
high-performing schools were not clearly distinct in
terms of the improvement strategies that they use.
Furthermore, in our data, low-performing schools and
high-performing schools all exert major efforts to
support a large and varied number of reform
strategies. The major difference that we found
between high- and low-performing schools is that
low-performing schools exert major efforts on more
reform strategies than high-performing schools.
Based on their self reports, low-performing schools
are supporting more strategies with more effort than
high-performing schools, but all schools are
prioritizing efforts in very similar ways. Other
recent research also finds common strategies adopted
across diverse groups of schools, even while certain
schools may emphasize particular strategies more
(GAO, 2009).

reporting as part of NCLB generally argued one of
two positions; either 1) that identifying challenges
unique to particular student subgroups will help
schools target their improvement strategies to
subgroups of students who need the most support, or
2) that examining subgroup performance would help
to identify schools that are not serving all students
well and would otherwise have been deemed
successful if only overall student performance was
considered. Though the literature here is sparse,
previous research on the use of subgroup data suggests
that some schools do make use of subgroup data to
target students (Booher-Jennings, 2005), sometimes in
ways that do not benefit particular student
populations (Valenzuela, 2004). While we do find that
disaggregation of data by student subgroups identifies
many schools as failing to make AYP that would not
otherwise have been identified, our research does not
find any claims of widespread use of data to target
particular subgroups. We find that schools with
different failing subgroups generally use improvement
efforts in similar ways, regardless of the particular
subgroup that is failing.

Second, we examine whether disaggregation of data
by the student subgroups required by NCLB (such as
race, socioeconomic status, and special education)
influences the selection of school improvement
strategies. Advocates for including subgroup

In sum, our findings deepen our understanding
about schools’ responses to accountability pressures.
Looking at all schools in a single state, we find that
schools at different achievement levels and with
different types of subgroup failures all appear to

Third, we ask a question related to the fundamental
goal of NCLB: Are the strategies that schools select
for improvement related to gains in academic
achievement? Although many educators and
policymakers express negativity about schools that
emphasize test preparation as a response to
accountability pressure, we find that when examining
nine categories of improvement strategies, test
preparation is most positively associated with
achievement gains. Though our research could not
determine a causal relationship between the emphasis
on test preparation and the improvement in test
scores, it suggests that schools may be justified in
choosing test preparation strategies because it helps
them to meet the goals of the accountability system
in which they work. Positive associations were also
found between achievement and strategies targeted at
providing remediation for struggling students and
strategies focusing on using data, suggesting these
strategies may also be successful ways for schools to
respond to high-stakes accountability measures.
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choose many varied strategies for improvement and
prioritize those efforts in very similar ways.
Additionally, we add to the evidence that test
preparation is both extremely popular and seems to
be the strategy most closely associated with testing
gains. These findings have important implications
for policymakers and practitioners alike. At the end
of this Policy Brief, we consider the implications of
these findings. First, we provide a bit more detail
about our research and results.

Policy Brief

Schools’ Strategies
for Improvement
Given that NCLB provides mechanisms for assessing
student and school performance but offers no
specific strategies for improvement, we were
interested in looking deeper into the strategies that
schools adopt. Specifically, we were interested in
examining whether schools failing to make AYP
adopt more or different types of improvement
strategies than those that have made AYP; and
whether schools with low performance in a
particular student subgroup act differently,
depending on the particular group that is failing.

Comparing Schools based on the AYP label.
Using survey data in combination with state test
performance data, we compared survey results for
schools making AYP and those failing to make AYP.
Table 1 shows that schools that fail to make AYP are
more likely to report placing major effort on each
one of the nine improvement categories (on average,
14 percentage points more likely). This may reflect a
reality that low-performing schools truly are placing
major effort on more school improvement strategies
than high-performing schools, or it may reflect the
effect of external pressure on school leaders. This
pressure may result from noting areas of low
performance in test results, from making those
results public, and/or from specific state and district
policies requiring certain actions of all schools or
those that fail to make AYP (evidence to support
this last point can be found in Padilla et al., 2006).

Table 1. Current Reform Strategies by AYP Status Ranked by Percent of Schools Placing Major Effort on Strategy
Full Sample
Reform Strategy

(%)

Rank

(%)

Rank

(%)

Use performance data to inform practice

1

72.0

1

69.5

1

78.2

Provide remediation for
underperforming students

2

66.8

2

64.6

2

72.1

Introduce new instructional approaches

3

52.1

3

48.0

3

62.2

Improve the quality/alignment of curriculum

4

48.2

4

44.2

5

58.2

Allot time for PSSA preparation

5

45.8

5

39.9

4

60.7

Address non-academic issues

6

44.6

6

39.8

6

56.5

Change school and/or staff schedules

7

31.0

7

26.8

7

41.3

Bring in outside support and expertise

8

21.4

8

17.7

9

30.5

Create rewards and sanctions
related to test performance

9

20.0

9

14.6

8

33.2

Sources: Calculations from Principal Survey data.
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Failed to
Make AYP

Rank

Sample Size

4

Made AYP

1900

1355

545

Notes: Sample size varies by question, due to non-response.

According to the survey results, regardless of AYP
classification, the relative popularity of categories of
improvement efforts is extremely similar between
the two groups of schools. The most popular
strategies (using student performance data and
providing remediation for struggling students) are
popular among schools that make AYP as well as
among schools that fail to make AYP. The least
popular strategies (introducing new rewards and
sanctions, bringing in outside support, and changing
students’ or teachers’ schedules) are consistently less
popular across the two types of schools. This
suggests that some goals of NCLB are being met;
data are being used and schools are trying to address
the needs of students who are not achieving.
Less popular strategies are those that are difficult
to implement or would require new resources
and policies.
It is also worth noting a couple of departures from
the general similarity between the two groups of
schools. First, more schools that failed to make AYP
than schools that made AYP report exerting major
effort on test preparation and addressing nonacademic issues. While 61% of schools that failed to
make AYP report placing major effort on test
preparation, only 40% of schools that made AYP
place major effort on this approach. However, it
does not appear that the effort placed on test
preparation and non-academic issues comes at the
expense of efforts to improve curriculum or
instruction. Even while they devote more effort to
test preparation, low-performing schools still report
engaging at similar levels to their higher performing
peers in the kinds of deeper reforms that some have
previously hypothesized are less likely to take place
in low-performing schools. Second, more schools
that failed to make AYP than schools that made AYP
report creating rewards and sanctions related to test
performance. In combination, these two differences
may suggest that schools failing to make AYP are
somewhat more attentive to issues directly related to
test performance.

school’s performance category. Certain reform
strategies were generally popular. Benchmark
testing, for example, was the most popular strategy
reported as a major effort both by schools that made
AYP (69%) and failed to make AYP (79%). Using
benchmark testing results to identify students for
remediation was a strategy for 60% of schools that
made AYP and 74% of schools that did not make
AYP. In combination, these demonstrate schools’
commitment to using data for school improvement
and to identify struggling students. Classroom
observation of teachers was the third most popular
strategy reported both by schools that made AYP
(63% ) and failed to make AYP (72%). Similarly,
certain reform efforts were generally unpopular.
Rewarding teachers for student performance, for
example, was only done at 3% of schools making
AYP and 10% of those failing to make AYP. Using
external consultants was also near the bottom of the
list for both school types.
The survey findings also highlight the fact that all
school leaders report exerting major effort to
support a large number of improvement efforts at
the same time. On average, principals reported
devoting moderate or major effort to 15 unique
strategies (of the 46 options listed on the survey) to
improve student performance. Figure 1 illustrates
the distribution of schools that reported devoting
major effort to various numbers of improvement
strategies. Even recognizing that some of the
strategies listed on the survey may overlap (for
example, “introducing block scheduling” and
“creating more time for reading instruction” were
two separate strategies on the survey, but could be
related in some cases), 15 is a large number of efforts
to focus on in a given year. It is worth considering
whether schools, particularly those schools that fail
to make AYP, can adequately support so many efforts
simultaneously.

As is true with the general improvement categories,
the popularity of specific improvement strategies is
extremely similar among schools that failed to make
AYP or made AYP. When looking at the 46
strategies that were listed on the survey (and are
each related to one of the nine categories), principals
prioritized efforts in similar ways regardless of the
CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION
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Figure 1. Number of Reform Strategies on which
Principals Reported Placing Major Effort

Our case-study visits to 11 schools—9 of which
were designated as in “warning status” due to failing
to make AYP for the first time in the year prior to
our visit – helped to provide a picture of how
schools respond to accountability pressure and may
help to explain the high levels of effort reported in
schools that failed to make AYP. We found that
teachers and administrators were quite concerned
about the “warning” label, reporting that the label
often led them to redouble their efforts in certain
ways. However, as the survey data suggest, staff did
not describe initiatives that were materially different
from their higher performing peers. Regardless of
performance level, interviewees described trying
everything they could think of that would help
students and improve test scores. As one teacher at a
low-performing elementary school stated, “When
you are in warning, it’s ‘I better plug a little bit
harder and go over things more, be more vigilant.’”
This sentiment is strikingly similar to that expressed
by the principal of a high-performing elementary
school who said, “Our scores are good; they could
be better…We do a lot of interventions in the
classroom and we do a lot of [test] prep obviously.”
In the 11 schools in our interview sample, it was not
possible to detect a difference in the numbers or
types of strategies that staff reported adopting. It is
clear that all respondents were actively trying to
improve student outcomes, with a special focus on
outcomes on the state tests (known as the
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment or
PSSA). The case study interviews also helped to
explain the overlapping nature of many of the
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strategies that were most popular on the survey.
Data use, for example, was often a starting point that
led staff to pursue other strategies, such as modifying
curriculum or targeting particular students.
Similarly, efforts to provide remediation to struggling
students often took the form of adopting new
instructional programs or engaging in explicit PSSA
preparation. In the interviews, the use of
standardized data from PSSAs or benchmark
assessments regularly preceded efforts in many of the
other improvement categories identified on the
survey. It is therefore not surprising that data use
was most commonly reported, as it was often a
precursor to other improvement efforts.
Looking at the Subgroups. As mentioned above,
one of the novel aspects of NCLB is the
disaggregation of performance data by student
subgroup. Our findings indicate that the
disaggregated data are not used in the
straightforward manner that some may have
thought; rarely did we find that those student
subgroups that failed to reach performance targets
were specifically targeted for additional support or
assistance. Almost a quarter of Pennsylvania schools
(24%) had one or fewer eligible student subgroups
(in schools with a single student subgroup, a racial
group was typically the subgroup), reducing the
likelihood of any real targeting based on AYP
categories. The reason for this is because of the
common overlap between a single subgroup and the
overall student population. For example, this most
commonly occurs when a school has a subgroup
because of the “White” student subgroup. When
this occurs, Whites tend to account for the vast
majority of students and thus “targeting” a part of
the student body based on AYP information is not
possible. Additionally, in about half of Pennsylvania
schools, all eligible student subgroups made AYP,
thus making it impossible to target subgroups based
on AYP status. Only 22% of schools in the state had
at least two eligible student subgroups where at least
one subgroup made AYP and at least one did not.
These would be the schools that would be most
likely to use subgroup AYP status as an indicator of
where they should focus their efforts.
Instead, we found, based on our survey data as well
as our interview data, that regardless of the student
subgroups that had been identified as failing, schools
generally use and prioritize improvement efforts in

similar ways. Our research suggests that some of the
similarity may be the result of reluctance on the part
of respondents to acknowledge targeting particular
demographic categories for attention. Other data
suggest that the NCLB-defined categories are not
highly relevant to school staffs. In our interviews,
respondents were somewhat conflicted about
whether or not the information about a subgroup’s
failure impacted the selection of a corresponding
improvement strategy.
A conversation with one principal conveys these
conflicted feelings. This principal was the leader of
an elementary school where the overall student
population was very close to the proficiency cut
score but the school had been labeled as in
“warning” due to the African American student
subgroup. He commented,
“This year I am meeting with the 3rd-, 4th-, and 5thgrade teachers once a month to try to target students.
That is what we have been trying to do, target
students, work with those students. We missed AYP on
one group last year and that was Black males.
Without targeting, it sounds terrible, ‘targeting Black
males,’ but that is what we are doing this year.”
Clearly, the principal is paying special attention to
the group of students who, according to the policy
and the school’s analysis, had been identified as the
reason for the school’s failing label. However, just a
few minutes later this same principal went on to say,
“I don’t think of a student as ‘oh, you are Black and
economically disadvantaged so we have to do this for
you.’ It’s, ‘How are your grades? Are you struggling?
OK we are going to get you help’…Maybe if I get
into school improvement one (the next tier for
accountability), I might think more that way, but to
me every kid is a kid…I don’t think of them in terms
of categories.”
This principal was certainly aware that his school
was labeled as being in “warning” and reported
giving the failing subgroup some additional
attention due to performance. However, he was not
entirely comfortable with that approach and
indicated that he also looked at all struggling
students regardless of their inclusion in a designated
“subgroup.” This desire to group all struggling
students together may limit the ability of school staff
to select interventions that are specific to unique

student subgroups. However, it may also focus
school staff on the particular academic needs of
students rather than their subgroup identification.
Further research is needed to determine the cause
and implications of staff reluctance to focus on
subgroup affiliation.
Staff at all schools also understood that proficiency
cutoffs were rising each year and that all schools are
in danger of being labeled as failing in the future. In
many cases, staff members spoke of identifying the
“bubble kids”—those on the cusp of proficiency on
the state test—and providing them with additional
attention or assistance. [Other research has also
identified the “bubble kid” phenomenon, e.g.,
Booher-Jennings (2005), Hamilton et al. (2007)].
The focus on bubble kids was an explicit strategy
to avoid failing to make AYP in the future, but
was not related to students’ membership in a
particular subgroup.
Finally, many schools reported supporting groups of
students’ identifiable academic needs, regardless of
their test performance. Clearly, certain student
subgroups, most notably the English Language
Learners and Special Education subgroups, may
require unique instructional efforts. However, our
interview respondents discussed identifying and
attempting to assist all students who struggled with
vocabulary or reading or other academic skills, rather
than focusing efforts based on subgroups. For all of
these reasons, if identification of subgroups was
intended to focus the attention or efforts of school
staffs on externally defined subgroups of students, it
did not seem fruitful.
Even while subgroup data were not used for
targeting, 57% of schools that failed to make AYP
failed due to the performance of one or more
student subgroups, not due to the overall
performance of the student body. This is the group
of schools that can be cited by advocates of
subgroup disaggregation who believed that it would
help us to identify schools that would otherwise be
viewed as performing adequately. Thus,
disaggregation helps in labeling schools as failing to
make AYP which, as shown above, is related to more
action and focus, though not necessarily different
types of action.

CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION
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As we saw with school performance overall, when
we examine the efforts of schools that fail as the
result of different student subgroups, we see very
similar prioritization of efforts. Table 2 illustrates the
prioritization of efforts across schools that failed to
make AYP for different reasons. The columns of
Table 2 show some of the most common causes of
schools failing to make AYP in Pennsylvania and the
percentages of those schools that are devoting major
effort to each of the improvement categories.

8

Looking across these schools that failed for different
reasons, and at those schools that passed, we again
see relatively similar behaviors (r>.89 for all
combinations). Even while low-performing schools
are more likely to devote energy to test preparation,
the data suggest that different groups of schools
prioritize efforts in similar ways. This finding also
suggests that providing schools with information
about which subgroups have failed to make AYP
does not affect behavior in a clear fashion.

Table 2. Current Reform Strategies by Pass / Reason for Fail – Ranked by Percent Placing Major Effort
PASS

FAIL

Reform Strategy
IEP

CPRE.ORG

Race &
Econ

Econ

Race &
IEP &
Econ

Econ &
IEP

Race

Use performance data to
inform practice

1 (69.5%)

1 (84.4%) 1 (76.8%) 1 (69.3%)

1 (80.0%) 1

(76.9%) 1

(82.2%)

Provide remediation to
underperforming students

2 (64.6%)

2 (75.8%) 2 (72.5%) 2 (66.3%)

3 (71.3%) 2

(73.1%) 2

(73.3%)

Introduce new
instructional approaches

3 (48.0%)

3 (61.4%) 4 (66.7%) 5 (50.5%)

2 (73.8%) 3

(67.3%) 6

(53.3%)

Improve the quality/
alignment of curriculum

4 (44.2%)

4 (57.5%) 6 (56.6%) 4 (55.5%)

6 (63.8%) 5

(50.0%) 4

(62.2%)

Address non-academic issues

5 (39.9%)

6 (50.0%) 3 (71.7%) 6 (47.0%)

5 (65.0%) 6

(46.2%) 3

(64.4%)

Allot time for
PSSA preparation

6 (39.8%)

5 (54.7%) 5 (60.2%) 3 (57.4%)

4 (68.8%) 4

(65.4%) 4

(62.2%)

Change school and/or
staff schedule

7 (26.8%)

7 (36.2%) 9 (38.4%) 7 (37.6%)

7 (55.0%) 7

(42.3%) 7

(42.2%)

Bring in outside support
and expertise

8 (17.7%)

8 (23.6%) 8 (41.4%) 8 (24.8%)

8 (40.0%) 9

(25.0%) 9

(26.7%)

Create rewards and
sanctions related to
test performance

9 (14.6%)

9 (21.4%) 7 (44.4%) 9 (23.8%)

8 (40.0%) 8

(39.2%) 8

(37.8%)

Strategy Selection
and Achievement
Given that schools of varying performance levels
seem to choose similar strategies for improvement,
we examined the link between schools’ strategy
selections and their subsequent achievement levels.
To do so, we used the survey results from
Pennsylvania principals and student performance
data from the PSSA exams, given in mathematics
and reading in Grades 3-8 and again in Grade 11.
The survey, given at a single point in time, asked
principals to identify how much effort their schools
were exerting on particular improvement initiatives
in the current year (2009) and in the previous year
(2008). In this way we attempted to capture changes
in school behaviors across two years. To assess
achievement, we used the total percentage of
students (in schools that responded to the survey)
performing at or above “proficient” on the
mathematics and reading exams in 2008 and 2009.
To examine the relationship between changes in
effort devoted to particular strategies and changes in
student performance, we ran a difference-indifference model, where the outcome was the change
in proficiency levels from 2008 to 2009, and the
independent variables were changes in the level of
effort principals reported their schools exerting on
each of the nine reform categories. In other words,
we checked to see if the schools that said they
increased levels of effort on particular reform
strategies were also the schools where proficiency
levels increased the most.
Though this method cannot support any causal
conclusions about which strategies are effective, we
found that an increased emphasis on test preparation
stood out as being significantly associated with
increased rates of proficiency in mathematics and
reading. This was the only one of the nine
categories where a change in the level of effort
exerted was significantly related to a change in
student performance in mathematics and reading.

Figure 2

As can be seen in Figure 2, schools that increased
their test preparation efforts between 2008 and 2009
(the bottom trend-line in Figure 2) also had an
average associated increase of about 4 percentage
points in their proficiency rates during that time. In
contrast, schools that either kept their level of effort
the same (the middle trend-line) or decreased their
level of effort (the top trend-line) showed an average
increase of only 1 and 1.5 percentage points
respectively. It does not appear that the schools that
increased their levels of effort on PSSA preparation
between 2008 and 2009 were already on a steeper
trajectory than those that did not—in fact, the
opposite appears to be true. From 2006 to 2008
those schools that decided to increase their test
preparation effort after 2008 showed little gain in
proficiency, whereas schools that either maintained
or reduced their levels of test preparation were
showing gains in achievement. This contrast makes
the change from 2008 to 2009 even more dramatic
for those schools that increased their level of effort
on PSSA preparation.
Furthermore, we found that a relationship may also
exist between increased remediation efforts and
mathematics proficiency, as well as increased use of
student performance data and reading proficiency,
although these latter findings were less robust than
the relationship between test preparation and

CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION

9

performance. Though these three improvement
efforts—test preparation, remediation, and data
use—are not directly related to a content focus, our
research suggests that they are related to increases in
proficiency levels on the state tests and may warrant
further study.

Policy Implications

Policy Brief

Although NCLB has been characterized as shining a
spotlight on student performance, that light is not as
bright or as focused as one might think. The claims
of accountability theory notwithstanding, our
findings suggest that schools at different
performance levels and with different types of
student subgroups choose similar, and numerous,
strategies for improvement. While it must be noted
that our findings are based on self-report, this
research contradicts some previous assertions that
high-performing schools and low-performing
schools respond very differently to accountability
pressure and adds to the evidence that schools at all
performance levels engage in a similar range of
improvement efforts.
These findings also differ from the commonly
accepted knowledge about the impact of
performance-based accountability measures on
schools, namely that schools will use their
performance data to select a few choice strategies for
improvement. Instead, we find that schools are
selecting many varied strategies, which is somewhat
like throwing many darts at a target and hoping that
one of them hits the bulls-eye. If the intent was to
have schools narrowly target specific efforts to
specific groups of students, there appears to be a
disconnect between the intent and reality of schools’
responses to NCLB. As policymakers and
practitioners consider new policies that may yield
higher levels of student achievement, we offer several
considerations for future policy designs.
Recognize that school performance is not
directly related to strategy selection. Though
there is evidence to dispute it, many believe that a
school with high- achieving students is a
fundamentally different place than a school with
lower achieving students. While this may be true in
some cases (for example, the quality of the teaching
staff or the resources available to students), it does
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not hold true in terms of the strategies that schools
are prioritizing to help students achieve. Some
strategies appear to be popular across the board (e.g.,
data use) and some are not (e.g., rewards and
sanctions). And there is evidence that schools that
fail to make AYP may devote more effort to explicit
test preparation. However, even given these caveats,
policymakers should take care to avoid
characterizing schools with high proficiency rates
and schools with low proficiency rates as schools
that behave in unique ways—there’s far more
similarity than difference. All schools report using
many strategies and prioritizing their efforts in very
similar ways. This may be the result of commonly
accepted practices thought to improve achievement
or the result of state or district leadership on specific
efforts, but the link between performance and types
of effort does not appear to be particularly strong.
Given very limited use, consider the purpose
of disaggregation of performance by student
subgroup. Descriptive information about the
performance of student subgroups may be
interesting and informative for education
stakeholders. In many cases subgroup performance
was the sole trigger for causing a school to fail to
make AYP. However, without clearer guidance on
what to do with this information, it is unlikely that
disaggregated results will be directly related to
changes in school improvement efforts. Eightyseven percent of all schools in this study reported
doing no targeting based on NCLB-defined student
subgroups. Educators in this study were much more
likely to describe focusing on groups of students
based on academic needs as opposed to membership
in a pre-defined group.
“Teaching to the test” is a rational response
to current policy. With a system that sets strict
proficiency thresholds and uses standardized tests to
measure performance, it is logical that schools at
varying performance levels opt for data analysis,
general test preparation, and individualized
remediation as their main strategies for
improvement. The research presented here shows
these strategies are related to performance outcomes
as measured on state tests. If policymakers would
like schools to stress other improvement strategies at
the school level, the accountability system must
include measures that do not focus on the
percentages of students meeting a proficiency

threshold and indicators that cannot be directly
affected by test-focused strategies. Instead,
policymakers could consider systems that assess
instructional quality, student growth rather than
status, and a host of non-cognitive measures that are
increasingly found to be related to later success (see
Farrington, Roderick, Allensworth, Nagaoka, Keyes,
Johnson, & Beechum, 2012 for more research on
these non-cognitive measures).
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Appendix – Data Collection Information
Interviews. Interviews were conducted with 48 principals using the sampling matrix below. Using
statewide data, all schools were categorized based on AYP status as well as whether they covered elementary
or high school grades. Principals were randomly selected from each of the categories identified below and
were contacted by telephone to participate in an interview of 30 to 45 minutes. Only one principal chose
not to participate in the interview and was replaced with another randomly selected principal.

Policy Brief

Table A1 – Interview Sampling Matrix
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AYP Status
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School Level
Elementary

High School

Total

Made AYP

4

4

8

Failed to make AYP - Whole School (Total)

4

4

8

Failed to make AYP - Special Education

4

4

8

Failed to make AYP - Economically Disadvantaged

4

4

8

Failed to make AYP - Racial subgroup

4

4

8

Failed to make AYP - Limited English Proficiency

4

4

8

TOTAL

24

24

48

Survey. An invitation to complete an on-line survey was sent via email to all principals in Pennsylvania.
Those who did not complete the survey on-line were sent paper copies. The table below provides
information about the survey sample.
Table A2 - Survey Response Information
Full Sample

Respondent

Non-Respondent

Proficient or Advanced in Math 2008 (%)

71.8

71.7

71.9

Proficient or Advanced in Read 2008 (%)

69.2

69.5

68.7

Made AYP (%)

78.3

78.8

77.5

School Size (number assessed)

300.0

306.0

287.9

0.6

0.6

0.6

Number of Subgroups Failing to make AYP
Grades Tested (School Type)

***

Grades 3-8

77.6

75.7

81.3

Grade 11

16.0

17.2

13.6

Mixed

6.4

7.1

5.1

3,002

1,996

1,006

Sample size

**

SOURCE: Pennsylvania Department of Education AYP Data.
NOTES: Calculations for this table used all available data for 3,002 schools. There were 18 schools that were not surveyed for reasons like
the fact that some schools closed between 2008 and 2009. An additional 80 schools did not have any students in the tested grades
(3,4,5,6,7,8, and 11).
A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between the program group and control group for variables that are not mutually exclusive
and mutually exhaustive (e.g., School Size). Levels for statistically significant differences between program and control groups are indicated
as: * = 10% ; ** = 5%; and *** = 1%.
A chi-squared test was applied to differences between the groups of categorical variables that are mutually exclusive and mutually
exhaustive (e.g., Grades Tested). Levels for statistically significant differences between program and control groups are indicated as: * =
10%; ** = 5%; and *** = 1%.
Missing values are not included in individual variable distributions.
Distributions may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Site visits. Site visits were conducted at 11 schools across the state of Pennsylvania. The 11 schools were
randomly selected from 11 of the categories shown in Table A1. (There was no high school in Pennsylvania
that failed to make AYP only as the result of the ELL subgroup, thus no school was visited in that category.)
Schools were invited to participate and two declined from our original sample. These were replaced with
two randomly selected schools. At each school, we spoke with the principal, assistant principal (if there was
one), leadership staff involved in school improvement efforts, and a sample of teachers (invited by the school
liaison) who taught in tested grades and subjects. Approximately, 10 to 15 individuals were interviewed at
each school. Each school was visited twice, in the spring of 2009 and 2010. In total, we conducted 162
interviews with 118 individuals.
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